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What has the invisible hand achieved? 
Ross L. Watts* 
Abstract-This paper was commissioned for the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales 
Information for Better Capital Markets Conference held on 19-20 December 2005. It evaluates the effect of the 
market on financial reporting recognising that financial reporting and accounting are only parts of a general re- 
porting, financing and governance equilibrium. That equilibrium is affected by the political process, as well as by 
capital and other markets. I explain how and why both market and political forces have influenced accounting and 
financial reporting and provide examples of those influences. Further, I draw implications for accounting standard- 
setting bodies that desire to change the nature of accounting and financial outcomes. Finally, I predict the effects 
of the radical standard-setting changes proposed by the FASB and IASB. 
1. Introduction 
When I was invited to present at this conference I 
was asked to address the question: ‘What has the 
invisible hand achieved? (in financial reporting)’. 
This is a rather broad question and an impossible 
one to answer using the evidence in the empirical 
accounting literature in capital markets alone. 
Accounting is only one mechanism in financial re- 
porting and corporate governance and it evolved to 
fit in with other mechanisms, to be part of a gen- 
eral reporting, financing and governance equilibri- 
um. The evidence in the international accounting 
literature is consistent with such an equilibrium 
(e.g., Ball et al., 2000). Evaluating the market’s ef- 
fect on financial reporting requires an understand- 
ing of the market’s effects on financing and 
corporate governance, an understanding of the ex- 
tent to which mechanisms in those areas substitute 
for, or complement, accounting and financial re- 
porting. Thus, evidence on the evolution of corpo- 
rate finance and governance is crucial to any 
assessment of the market’s achievements in finan- 
cial reporting 
Another factor that is crucial in the assessment 
of the market is the legal and political environ- 
ment. Markets require property rights in order to 
function. The nature of those property rights af- 
fects financial reporting. For example, the effec- 
tive limited liability of joint stock companies 
appears to have influenced debt contracts and the 
accounting in those contracts and in shareholder 
reports (see Watts, 2003). When the political 
process produces changes in property rights, the 
*The author is at the Sloan School, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. This paper was presented at the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales Information for 
Better Capital Markets Conference in London on 20 
December 2005. He is grateful to Ryan LaFond, Karthik 
Ramanna, Sugata Roychowdhury and Joseph Weber for their 
comments. All remaining errors are the author’s. E-mail: 
rwatts@ mit .edu 
market adjusts. When shareholders’ rights to bring 
litigation were changed in the US in the second 
half of the twentieth century the market responded 
by making accounting and financial reporting 
more conservative despite the antipathy of the 
Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) to- 
wards conservatism in financial reporting (see 
Basu, 1997; Holthausen and Watts, 2001). The na- 
ture of financial reporting and accounting that 
evolves in the market is influenced by the political 
process and as a result the market demand for fi- 
nancial reporting also influences the political 
process (see for example Watts and Zimmerman, 
1978; Ramanna, 2005). 
The consequence is that the market achieve- 
ments are a function of economic forces that de- 
termine both the private economic arrangements 
and the outcomes of the political process. If pro- 
posed changes in accounting standards and finan- 
cial reporting ignore those economic forces and 
generate unverifiable accounting numbers and the 
market is unable to prevent those changes occur- 
ring and/or adjust for them, the market will tend to 
ignore the resultant financial statements and dis- 
closures and find other ways to meet the demand 
for financial reporting.’ 
Understanding the market’s achievements re- 
quires an understanding of the market’s responses 
to the demand for accounting and financial report- 
ing that is generated both from the market and 
from the political process. My objectives in this 
paper are to: 
i )  explain the how the market has responded in 
the past to demands in the market itself and to 
demands that come through the political 
process; 
I Evidence of the market ignoring unverifiable accounting 
numbers can be found in Leftwich (1983), who reports that 
debt contracts exclude goodwill when measuring total assets. 
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ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
dend payments and reduce the agency costs of 
debt. Such restrictions appeared around the time 
faceless share trading started in the London stock 
market.2 Faceless share trading effectively gener- 
ated limited liability, which in turn made borrow- 
ing very d i f f i~u l t .~  Dividend covenants in debt 
contracts made it less likely that funds could be 
inappropriately distributed to shareholders. 
Anticipation of losses and lack of anticipation of 
gains meant that net assets were likely to be a 
‘hard’ number. That accounting is similar to cor- 
porate liquidators’ accounting when making 
timely distributions to claimholders in a way that 
does not violate legal priorities. 
Individuals also have limited liability in the 
sense that there is a limit to the penalties that can 
be imposed on them. That limited liability com- 
bined with the manager’s limited tenure and hori- 
zon (e.g., retirement) likely plays a role in 
accounting’s conservatism (Watts, 2003). The 
manager has an incentive to recognise gains and 
defer losses until after he has left the firm to avoid 
being fired and to earn higher earnings-based com- 
pensation. Once paid, such compensation is diffi- 
cult to recover. Conservatism defers recognition of 
the gains until there is verifiable evidence that the 
gains exist, or in other words until there is ‘hard’ 
evidence (see below). 
The empirical evidence is consistent with the 
limited liability of the shareholders (managers) in- 
ducing asymmetric loss functions for the debthold- 
ers (shareholders) in contracting with shareholders 
(managers) (Watts, 2003). These asymmetric loss 
functions caused efficient debt and compensation 
contracts and corporate governance mechanisms 
to use conservative accounting that deferred 
recognition of gains. That deferral reduced the 
amount of inappropriate early distributions to both 
shareholders and managers. 
2.3. Timely reporting 
The evidence also suggests that while conser- 
vatism is part of the efficient private contracting 
and governance accounting procedures, it does not 
alone determine the recognition of gains. 
Timeliness of reporting is also important. Before 
formal standard-setting there was variation in the 
timeliness of recognition of gains across indus- 
52 
ii) 
iii) 
derive implications for standard-setting bodies 
and others who want to change the nature of 
accounting and financial reporting; and 
predict the effects of current proposed stan- 
dards. 
To those ends the next section explains how and 
why private market forces have influenced ac- 
counting and financial reporting. Section 3 ex- 
plains how and why the political process and the 
courts have affected accounting reporting. In 
Section 4, I provide implications for how account- 
ing reporting standards should be set. Section 5 
predicts the eventual outcomes if the FASB and 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
continue in their apparent resolve to fundamental- 
ly change the nature of accounting and financial 
reporting. Finally, Section 6 provides a summary 
and my conclusions. 
2. Private market forces and financial 
reporting 
2 . I .  Agency costs andJinancia1 reporting 
The original development of accounting and fi- 
nancial reporting appears to be driven by control 
of agency costs. These costs arise when a princi- 
pal delegates decision-making ability to an agent 
who maximises his own welfare rather than that 
of the principal. There is considerable evidence 
that writing itself was developed in order to allow 
for accounting and control of the costs of agency 
relations such as that between a noble and a stew- 
ard (de Ste Croix, 1956; Yamey, 1962; Chadwick, 
1992). Millennia later, the wardens of English 
medieval guilds would prepare and present audit- 
ed financial accounts as a mechanism to reduce 
agency costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). The 
early English companies inherited this mecha- 
nism from the guilds. For example, even in its 
first years the British East India Company pre- 
pared annual audited financial statements and 
presented those statements to its shareholders 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Effectively, au- 
dited financial reporting was a corporate gover- 
nance mechanism. 
2.2. Accounting conservatism 
The audited financial statements also played a 
role in the early English company’s contracts. In 
Watts (2003) I argue that the use of those finan- 
cial reports in debt contracts influenced the na- 
ture of accounting, providing an incentive for 
conservatism: a higher standard of verifiability 
for recognition of gains than for losses. This 
asymmetric recognition of gains and losses gen- 
erated an understatement of net assets. 
Effectively it produced a lower bound estimate 
for net assets that could be used to restrict divi- 
Kehl (1941:4) reports that in 1620 the corporate charter of 
the New River Company included a provision that dividends 
could be paid from corporate profits only. He also states that 
those provisions were employed in the rest of the seventeenth 
century and became increasingly more common in the eigh- 
teenth century. This time series suggests that the inclusion of 
the dividend provision in charters was voluntary. 
DuBois (1938:95) concludes that de fact0 limited liability 
existed by the 1730s and 1740s and that ‘for England at any 
rate, the fact of incorporation either by the Crown or by 
Parliament came to be the criterion for the extent of limited li- 
ability’ (p. 96). 
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International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 53 
tries, presumably induced by 'common law' type 
principles enforced by auditors." 
Figure 1 reproduces a graph of the operating 
cycle produced by the Australian Accounting 
Research Foundation. The different boxes in the 
graph can be considered as potential points for the 
recognition of profit. The most timely recognition 
would be at point 1 when the entrepreneur first has 
the idea for a positive net present value project. 
This is the point that Jeff Skilling (PresidentKO0 
and briefly, CEO of Enron) argued should be used 
for recognising profits and at which Enron did 
recognise 'profits' in many cases (McLean and 
Elkind, 2003). The problem with point one is that 
the expected cash flows for the profits are in the 
future, very uncertain and not verifiable. 
Recognition at that point is likely to generate 
frauds (as in Enron's case). 
As one moves around the cycle, the outcome be- 
comes less uncertain. Historically, accounting 
waited for the profits to become verifiable. By the 
beginning of the twentieth century most firms 
recognised profit at the time title to goods passed, 
at the time of delivery (point 8). However, in some 
industries firms were able to recognise profit at an 
earlier point in the operating cycle, in particular at 
points 5 and 6. Two prominent examples of such 
industries are mining and construction. Until the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Staff 
Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 101 (SEC, 1999), 
some mining firms listed on US exchanges still 
recognised profit at production (Demers et al., 
2005). Why were firms in these industries able to 
recognise profits earlier than other firms? The ap- 
parent answer is that the mining firms had con- 
tracts for the forward sale of their output. The 
output's sale and its sale price were guaranteed by 
contract, so recognition of profit at production 
would not induce overproduction by management 
to overstate profits (create frauds). In construction, 
some firms had contracts that gave them guaran- 
teed payments at various stages of the construction 
process. This evidence suggests that when the na- 
ture of the sales contracts made fraud less likely 
and profits verifiable, efficient private accounting 
allowed profits to be more timely. Profits were re- 
ported as soon as they were verifiable. 
2.4.  The nature of the balance sheet and income 
statement 
The emphasis in private contracting is on distri- 
bution of net assets so the balance sheet is a con- 
servative estimate of the value of the net assets 
rather than a measure of firm value (i.e., the bal- 
ance sheet did not incorporate the value of rents). 
Intangibles such as goodwill are excluded from the 
calculation of net assets in debt contracts 
See Matheson (1893) for a discussion of the auditors' 
fights with managers over accounting procedures. 
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54 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
(Leftwich, 1983). Consistent with this contracting, 
before the Securities Acts in the US, goodwill was 
typically written off the balance sheet as soon as 
possible, often being reduced immediately to one 
dollar (Ely and Waymire, 1999).5 In the UK good- 
will was written off against equity. Accounting in- 
come measured increases in net assets (excluding 
intangibles) before dividends. 
The probable reason that goodwill was removed 
from the balance sheet and changes in goodwill 
were not considered in the income statement is that 
estimates of goodwill are typically not verifiable. 
Goodwill and some other intangible assets repre- 
sent rents or economic profits (the ability to earn a 
rate of return above the appropriate capital market 
rate). Their periodic estimation requires valuation 
of the firm (or part of the firm) and that valuation 
is frequently not verifiable (Watts, 2003). Further, 
when firms were in danger of violating debt 
covenants, goodwill was likely to be approaching 
zero (Holthausen and Watts, 200 I) .  Inclusion of 
goodwill in the balance sheet and changes in good- 
will in the income statement would make account- 
ing numbers ‘soft’ and open to fraud and 
manipulation. 
It is important to note that even though market- 
driven accounting was conservative prior to the es- 
tablishment of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in 1934 , tangible asset values 
were occasionally written up to their market value 
when the increased asset value was verifiable. 
Fabricant (1936) reports that in a sample of 208 
large listed industrial US firms in the period 
1925-1 934 there were 70 write-ups of property, 
plant and equipment and 43 write-ups of invest- 
ments. The investment write-ups were likely secu- 
rities traded in liquid markets where the market 
value could be observed. Revaluation of property 
was associated with financing (Finney, 1935, ch. 
40). If an independent appraiser had valued the 
property for refinancing purposes, the appraised 
value was likely to be verifiable (particularly if the 
appraiser was employed by the lender). Just as in 
the operating cycle, market accounting allowed 
greater timeliness when there was verifiability. 
The SEC effectively banned asset write-ups in the 
late 1930’s (Zeff, 1972:15&160; Walker, 1992) 
2.5. The role offinancial reporting in providing 
information to the market 
As indicated above, the early English companies 
did present audited financial statements to the 
shareholders at the annual general meeting. The 
tremendous growth of the London stock market in 
the second half of the nineteenth century caused 
substantial changes in the auditing of financial 
statements and the provision of financial reports 
for investment purposes! From 1844-1900 the 
UK company acts did not require an outside audi- 
tor and from 1856 to 1900 an audit was not even 
required (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; Hunt, 
1935). At the beginning of the period audits were 
conducted by non-director shareholders, but by 
1900 when the compulsory audit was reintro- 
duced, ‘the accounts of most of them (public com- 
panies) were not only audited but were in fact 
audited by chartered accountants. Indeed, practice 
had outrun legal minima’ (Hunt, 1935454). The 
growth of the professional audit firm was a market 
phenomenon and indeed, the accreditation of audi- 
tors was a market phenomenon (Watts and 
Zimmerrnan, 1983). 
Further, the audited financial statements were 
apparently given to non-shareholders. In the 1890s 
British auditors came to the US to audit US firms 
raising capital in London because their firms’ rep- 
utations were important to the success of those is- 
sues (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983; DeMond, 
1951). Stock exchange requirements played a role 
in the presentation of audited financial statements 
in the US (see Benston, 1969). Such requirements 
were introduced not because of governmental reg- 
ulation but because the exchanges found it to be in 
their own self interest. Different US exchanges 
had different requirements allowing variation in 
the quality of information presented. 
Despite the use of audited financial statements 
for evaluation of investments, prior to the US 
Securities Acts the accounting produced by listed 
companies for the purpose of raising capital was 
essentially the same accounting produced for con- 
tracting and control purposes. Daines (1 929:94) 
describes the dominant objective of accounting as 
being ‘to reflect that income which is legally avail- 
able for dividends’. Further, even though the 
Securities Acts were based on a broader informa- 
tion role for financial reports, US practice and 
opinion among accountants was slow to change in 
that direction. Forty years after the Securities Acts, 
a 1975 FASB survey found that only 37% of re- 
spondents agreed with the information role being 
the basic objective of financial statements. Those 
disagreeing took the position that ‘the basic func- 
tion of financial statements was to report on man- 
agement’s stewardship of corporate assets and that 
the informational needs of readers was of second- 
ary importance’ (Armstrong, 1977:77). 
State company law dividend restrictions caused the man- 
agement of some companies not to write-off goodwill because 
the write-off would prevent them paying dividends. 
Between 1853 and 1893 the nominal value of listed secu- 
rities on the London stock exchange increased by a factor of 
14 (Morgan and Thomas, 1962). 
Why didn’t accounting take on the broader role 
suggested by today’s standard-setters and provide 
a broader range of information and even estimates 
of the market Of the firm (as imp1icit in 
FASB proposals)? Why did the general opinion of 
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International Accounting Policy Forum. 2006 
accountants in the US disagree with that broader 
view, 40 years after the Securities Acts? My an- 
swer is that the evidence suggests accounting’s 
comparative advantage in supplying information 
to capital markets is something other than produc- 
ing a broad range of information or an estimate of 
firm value. It is to produce ‘hard’ verifiable num- 
bers that discipline other sources of information? 
Let us look at the relation between information 
and the stock market price. The stock market price 
for a security is the result of the interaction of large 
numbers of investors all with varying information 
about the firm. No one investor has all the infor- 
mation. Those investors buy or sell based on their 
information. The more confident they are in their 
information the more they bet and the investors 
who are successful in gaining and using the infor- 
mation survive and have more wealth to continue 
to operate. The result is that the stock price con- 
tains more information than the information of any 
single investor (Hayek, 1945). The accountant, or 
financial reporting in general, cannot hope to pro- 
duce a range of information anywhere near what is 
in the price or to generate an estimate of a firm’s 
equity value that captures much of the information 
that is in the market price. Despite some anom- 
alous evidence, the great bulk of the evidence in fi- 
nance supports this conclusion. 
How then does accounting fit into the supply of 
information to capital markets? The outcomes of 
events implied by information eventually flow 
through the company’s cash flows. Accounting does 
not wait for all the cash flows to occur. For exam- 
ple, in Figure 1 profit is recognised (at sale or pro- 
duction) before cash inflows occur. Accounting is 
more timely than cash flows (e.g., Dechow, 1994), 
but accounting information in financial statements 
is still generally verifiable or ‘hard’. Most recent 
frauds are not due to soft standards, but are the re- 
sult of a failure to apply existing standards. 
If an analyst reports an expected increase in a 
company’s profitability, the quality of the analyst’s 
information can be checked by observing whether 
the company’s accounting income later reflects that 
predicted increase. Market participants come to 
learn which analysts are better predictors and better 
sources of information than other analysts and con- 
sequently stock prices react more to those analysts’ 
information. If accounting standard-setters force 
accountants to include unverifiable value changes 
in income, income will become noisy and frauds 
will increase. This will reduce the ability of the 
market to identify the most reliable analysts and in- 
deed the most reliable other sources of information. 
If accounting financial statements become ‘soft’ so 
will the information generated by other sources. 
55 
2.6. Market reactions to so) accounting and 
financial reporting 
Soft accounting standards generated by standard 
setters will generate market reactions. Any reduc- 
tion in the usefulness of financial reporting will 
provide incentives for private alternative account- 
ing and financial reporting systems to appear. An 
example of a private alternative to formal stan- 
dards is Standard and Poor’s search to identify 
and report ‘core earnings’ (Business Week Online, 
24 October 2002). Increasing frauds due to unver- 
ifiable numbers will generate increases in US liti- 
gation costs and induce conservatism by 
management (Basu, 1997; Holthausen and Watts, 
200 1). Finally, managers will react to dysfunction- 
al standards by using the political process to 
change the standards. 
The history of US accounting standard-setting is 
replete with instances of managers and other par- 
ties using the political process to influence ac- 
counting standards and indeed to change the 
accounting standard-setting body. The Securities 
Acts gave the SEC power to set accounting stan- 
dards for listed firms’ filings in order (among other 
things) to reduce the variety of accounting proce- 
dures. Over the years since, the SEC has delegated 
the setting of standards first to the Committee 
on Accounting Procedures (CAP) (1939-1959), 
then the Accounting Principles Board (APB) 
(1960-1973) and finally the FASB (1973-?). The 
inability of the CAP to reduce the diversity of ac- 
counting procedures, ill-will from management 
from the attempted elimination of procedures and 
consequent pressure from Congress was the cause 
of the CAP’S demise in 1959 (Moonitz, 1974). The 
APB alienated corporate management, politicians 
and the financial community with its proposals on 
business combinations (pooling) and other issues 
and consequent Congressional pressure caused it 
to be replaced by the FASB (Zeff and Dharan, 
1994:2-3). The FASB’s survival and the consis- 
tency of US standards with IASB standards 
depends heavily on the political process. Standard- 
setters cannot depart significantly from the market 
equilibrium without their standards being sup- 
planted by private alternatives or themselves being 
replaced by an alternative mechanism via the po- 
litical process. Finally, the courts’ interpretations 
of the accounting that results from the standards 
play a major role in how standards work in prac- 
tice. 
~ ~ ~~ 
’ Lambert (1996) and Ball (2001) also suggest accounting 
plays a role in disciplining other sources of information. 
3. Political forces and financial reporting 
For convenience, I include the legal system, the 
political system and regulation in the conduits for 
political forces affecting accounting and financial 
reporting. 
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56 
3.1. Legal system 
There is evidence that US courts significantly in- 
creased the Conservatism reflected in listed firms’ 
published financial statements. Informal and for- 
mal evidence (Holthausen and Watts, 2001) sug- 
gests US financial statements were conservative 
before the Securities Acts as expected from the 
contracting and corporate governance forces act- 
ing in the market. However, there was relatively 
little litigation under those acts until the rules for 
bringing class action suits were changed in 1966 
(see Kellogg, 1984; Kothari et al., 1988). The rules 
change enabled lawyers to act as entrepreneurs in 
bringing lawsuits and increased litigation signifi- 
cantly. The legal market responded to the change 
in rules and caused a large increase in the conser- 
vatism of the financial reports - a market response 
by corporate managers. 
At one level, the explanation for why increased 
litigation produced more conservatism in the US is 
relatively simple as Beaver (1993) and Watts 
(1993) pointed out. The reason is that in securities 
suits, buyer suits outnumber seller suits by 13 to 
one (Kellogg, 1984). If a firm overstates its in- 
come and net assets, a suit is much more likely 
than if the firm understates its income and net as- 
sets. Basu (1997) uses periods of changing liabili- 
ty identified in Kothari et al. (1988) to test and 
confirm the Beaver and Watts prediction. 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) confirm the Basu re- 
sults on a longer period. On the basis of the US lit- 
igation effect, Ball et al. (2000) predict that 
financial statements of UK listed companies are 
less conservative than the statements of US listed 
companies. They find results consistent with that 
prediction. 
At a deeper level, the explanation for litigation’s 
effect on conservatism could be related to the con- 
servatism generated by market accounting. US 
courts’ asymmetric treatment of realised losses 
(buyers’ suits) and foregone profits (seller’s suits) 
mirrors a similar asymmetry found in regulation 
by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) that 
might also reflect court behaviour (Peltzman, 
1976). The FDA acts as though realised deaths or 
realised side effects of drugs released are more im- 
portant than lives lost because drugs are not re- 
leased. Perhaps it is more difficult to produce 
verifiable evidence of profits that might have been 
made and lives that might have been saved than to 
produce verifiable evidence of losses that actually 
occur and the cause of deaths that actually occur. 
Whether it is that explanation or whether there is 
an asymmetric loss function in the public sector as 
well as in the private sector, accounting financial 
statements generate asymmetric costs for gains 
and losses. Given the size of litigation in the US, 
accounting financial statements and disclosures 
(Hutton et al., 2003) are likely to continue to be 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
conservative regardless of the standards intro- 
duced by the FASB. 
3.2. The political process and regulation 
The political process has significant influence on 
accounting standards at least in the US (Watts, 
1977; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Ramanna, 
2005) and likely in the UK as well. Congressional 
concern with standards played a role in the re- 
placement of the APB by the FASB. Recent FASB 
examples of Congressional involvement include: 
SFAS 115 (accounting for securities investments, 
FASB , 1993); SFAS 123 (expensing employee 
stock options, FASB, 1995); SFAS 133 (account- 
ing for derivatives and hedges, FASB, 1998); 
SFAS 141 (elimination of pooling, 2001a) and 
SFAS 142 (impairment of goodwill, FASB, 
200 1 b) . 
In the last case (SFAS 141 & 142) opponents of 
the elimination of pooling had a bill introduced 
into Congress to override the FASB. With that bill 
in Congress, opponents went to the FASB with a 
compromise that would eliminate the amortisation 
of goodwill and replace it with impairment. The 
FASB adopted the compromise even though the 
compromise in effect made firms that pooled ‘bet- 
ter off’ in terms of their objectives: the opponents 
kept the stronger income that pooling produces by 
eliminating amortisation; and they gained the 
stronger balance sheet that purchase generates. 
The stronger balance sheet can be achieved be- 
cause the valuations for determining goodwill im- 
pairment are unverifiable so that impairment can 
be avoided (Watts, 2000; Ramanna, 2005). The 
impairment is assessed at the reporting unit level 
where there is typically no observable equity mar- 
ket value. Ramanna (2005) is able to predict the 
positions of firms lobbying on the standards using 
those firms’ ability to manipulate the estimated 
values necessary for impairment. 
History makes it apparent that standard-setting 
in the US is constrained by political forces - if the 
standard is too far from a political equilibrium, it 
cannot last. The long-term political equilibrium in 
the US appears to require conservatism, so it is 
likely that SFAS 142 will not last in its current 
form. Some of the firms with unverifiable good- 
will that are underperforming will fail and in the 
political process part of the blame for failure will 
be attached to the failure of the accounting meth- 
ods to recognise that assets were overstated. 
Watts (1 977:67) argues that conservatism is the 
equilibrium in the political process because losses 
from overstatement of asset values and income are 
more observable and usable in the political process 
than foregone gains from understatement of assets 
and income. This in turn could be due to differ- 
ences in ability to verify or differences in loss 
functions (see above), but regardless of reason, 
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conservatism’s effects are apparent. The rationale 
for the Securities Acts was that the NYSE crash in 
1929 was due to overstatement of assets and in- 
come (Benston, 1969). This rationale caused the 
SEC to ban upward revaluations of assets for 30 
years (Zeff, 1972:156-160; Walker, 1992). And, 
there is other evidence that the SEC is still more 
conservative than the market: the revenue recogni- 
tion standards in SAB 101 are more conservative 
than market forces would dictate. Vogt (2001) 
points out that in some cases SAB 101 requires 
less timely recognition than implied by contract 
law. Certainly, SAB 101 did stop some mining 
companies from recognising profit at production 
in circumstances the market had allowed for at 
least a century (see above). 
The Vogt (2001) paper is an example of the lim- 
its the market places on standard-setters and regu- 
lators. The paper is aimed at contracting 
professionals and provides examples of how to 
write contracts to avoid the over-conservative con- 
sequences of SAB 101, for example how to con- 
tract to ensure revenue is recognised at sale with 
no deferral. At the other end of the spectrum we 
observe the finance community working hard to 
allow their clients to avoid constraints on capital- 
king leases so as to keep debt off the balance sheet 
and generating new securities to produce ‘instant’ 
profits (see below). 
The bottom line is that in the US, the behaviour 
of the courts, Congress and regulatory bodies such 
as the SEC and Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) will ensure that US ac- 
counting standards will be conservative. This will 
constrain the FASB’s ability to introduce and sus- 
tain accounting standards that involve unverifiable 
asset and income increases. Given that we observe 
conservatism generated privately by contracting 
and other market forces in the UK, I would expect 
similar but perhaps weaker restrictions on stan- 
dard-setting there as well. 
51 
have a conceptual framework that is flexible 
enough to accommodate equilibrium accounting 
methods resulting from the economic and politi- 
cal forces 
4. Implications for accounting standard- 
setting and financial reporting reforms 
The cumulative evidence on the economic forces 
acting on accounting via the market and political 
processes provides strong cautions for those pro- 
posing to reform or significantly change account- 
ing and financial reporting. If those proponents 
want their reforms or changes to work and last, 
they must ensure those reforms or changes: 
anticipate how managers and others will react to 
any standards or proposed reforms; 
require verifiable numbers for financial state- 
ments; 
do not try to value the firm; 
allow conservatism; and 
4.1.  Anticipate reactions to standards 
If standard-setters or reformers want their stan- 
dards or reforms to be introduced and to last, they 
have to look ahead to how various individuals will 
react to the standards or reforms, particularly man- 
agers. A good standard or reform is one that works 
in practice and how it works in practice will de- 
pend on how managers and others use it. 
In Watts (2003) I report an example of a stan- 
dard-setting body’s failure to anticipate managers’ 
reactions and their consequences. As a market 
maker in energy-related contracts and derivatives, 
Enron management marked those instruments to 
market (trading securities) and reflected the value 
changes in earnings used in bonus compensation 
(McGraw-Hill Inc., 2002). The FASB’s Emerging 
Issues Task Force (EITF) allowed managers of 
firms making markets in thinly traded energy-re- 
lated contracts and derivatives the discretion to 
choose the ‘bid’ price or the ‘ask’ price for valuing 
those instruments at the end of a period. As a mar- 
ket maker (in some cases the only market maker) 
Enron could determine those prices (Weil, 2001). 
Weil reports that Enron’s ask prices often were as 
much as eight times their bid prices. Given such 
high ask prices would not lead to sales, they pro- 
duced significantly overstated values and earnings. 
It is difficult to imagine how any experienced au- 
ditors on the EITF could not anticipate such an ob- 
vious result. 
4.2.  Require verifiability 
At present the FASB is proposing to revise SFAS 
141 to allow profits to be recognised on ‘bargain 
purchases’ (FASB, 2005a). These are acquisitions 
where the fair value of the net assets of the firm ac- 
quired exceed the acquisition price. Since the fair 
value of the net assets is determined by the man- 
agement of the acquiring company this seems to 
allow unverifiable ‘instant’ profits on acquisitions. 
Management of more than a few companies are 
certain to take advantage of this opportunity to 
overstate and inject noise into their earnings, mak- 
ing accounting and financial reporting ‘softer’. 
In their current state, SFAS 141 and 142 intro- 
duce unverifiable estimates into accounting 
(Watts, 2003). They require the recognition of dif- 
ferent types of intangible assets that in total repre- 
sent rents. Given that rents are essentially the 
return to monopoly power, they do not represent 
individual assets (unless they are separable and 
saleable in the form of a licence or a taxi medal- 
lion). Any attempt to allocate rents to individual 
intangible assets is equivalent to allocating joint 
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benefits: no meaningful allocation is possible. Any 
one allocation of rents is as good as another, so the 
required allocation provides managers with oppor- 
tunities to introduce both noise and bias into eam- 
ings. Earnings become ‘softer’. 
The impossibility of meaningful rent allocation 
appears to be used by managers to avoid goodwill 
impairment under SFAS 142. That standard re- 
quires acquired goodwill to be allocated across re- 
porting units. If there are synergies between the 
reporting units, there is no meaningful way to 
make those allocations. This provides managers 
with the opportunity to locate purchased goodwill 
in reporting units that already have large unrecog- 
nised rents or goodwill (they have grown their own 
goodwill). Since impairment is assessed at the re- 
porting unit level, that unrecognised goodwill will 
mask any overpayment and consequent goodwill 
overstatement and significantly reduce the likeli- 
hood of future impairment. 
In addition, the SFAS 142 requirement that, in 
order to estimate goodwill impairment, managers 
estimate the value of reporting the unit using dis- 
counted forecasted future cash flows, forecasted 
earnings and earnings multiples, or other similar 
methods also considerably increases the ‘softness’ 
of earnings. Anyone who has tried to value a 
growth firm knows how difficult it is to forecast 
future cash and how large a range of values are 
possible. With the market value of the reporting 
unit unobservable, the management’s valuations of 
those units are certainly not verifiable. The conse- 
quence is that despite the fact that many firms 
recognised goodwill impairment in SFAS 142’s 
transitional year (for big bath and below-the-line 
reporting reasons) hundreds of firm with a market- 
to-book ratio less than one did not report impair- 
ments (Beatty and Weber, 2005). SFAS 142 
introduced considerable variation in earnings 
across firms, variation that is due to lack of con- 
sistent treatment of goodwill impairment. Earnings 
became ‘softer’ and noisier. 
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porting compete with the market in this dimen- 
sion? Concentrating on such estimation to the 
detriment of providing hard data that help market 
participants estimate market value seems perverse. 
It is likely to reduce information in the market- 
place both by making accounting numbers less 
meaningful and removing accounting’s discipli- 
nary role from the market. At a minimum, tradition- 
al transaction-based financial statements should be 
retained as one set of information provided. 
4.3.  Do not try to value the firm 
Earlier in this paper I made the argument that the 
market value of a listed firm is likely to incorpo- 
rate more information and be a harder estimate of 
value than a manager’s unverifiable estimate. 
Holthausen and Watts (2001) make the same argu- 
ment. Why should accounting and financial re- 
The evidence on the nature of asset revaluations 
(Fabricant, 1936; Finney. 1935) suggests they were not fraud- 
ulent. Further, economists consider the cause of the depression 
to be trade wars (Kindleberger, 1986) and poor monetary pol- 
icy (Friedman and Schartz, 1963). By the end of 1929 the Dow 
Jones Index had recovered to record a loss for 1929 of only 
17% and stock prices continued rising in early 1930. In 1930 
President Hoover signed the Smoot-Hawley tariff. raising tar- 
iffs on dutiable items by 5 2 8 .  
4.4.  Allow conservatism 
In the US, any attempt to ban accounting con- 
servatism is sure to fail. Pressures from the courts 
and from the regulatory and political process will 
induce many managers and accountants to make 
financial statements conservative nevertheless. At 
the same time, a lack of conservatism will allow 
some managers to generate frauds. The consequent 
political reaction to such frauds will eventually 
generate removal of the responsible standards and 
likely eventual removal of the responsible stan- 
dard-setting body. 
The usual reason for opposing conservatism is 
that the information provided in financial state- 
ments should be unbiased and as noise free as 
practicable. If unbiased and low noise information 
in practice is the objective then the response of 
some managers to an unverifiable standard should 
be anticipated and built into the design of the stan- 
dard. The EITF and FASB examples given above 
provide strong support for this prescription. 
4.5.  An accommodating conceptual framework 
The US Securities Acts were built on a myth: 
that accounting and financial reporting caused the 
1929 NYSE crash and the great depression.* That 
story provided a convenient rationale for the 
Securities Acts and the appearance that Congress 
was doing something to remove the causes of 
those calamities. The rationale also created a de- 
mand for a conceptual framework to guide the reg- 
ulation of accounting and financial reporting 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1979). The SEC (aware 
of the substantial variation in existing accounting 
and reporting and the economic and political costs 
generated by standardisation) passed that role onto 
a sequence of private standard-setting bodies. The 
normative conceptual frameworks that emerged to 
provide guidance and rationales for choice of ac- 
counting and reporting procedures do not take ac- 
count of the market and political processes that 
determine the nature of accounting and financial 
reporting. And, it is not apparent that completely 
open and frank consideration of those forces 
would be politically viable. However, considera- 
tion of the forces in determining the framework is 
essential to prevent the proliferation of standards 
that stand no chance of achieving their objectives. 
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5. Likely outcome of proposed changes in 
reporting 
I foresee a number of likely outcomes of the cur- 
rently proposed changes in financial reporting, 
given the economic and political forces that deter- 
mine accounting practice: 
5.1. International accounting standards 
It is difficult to envisage a true standardisation of 
international accounting standards. First, the US 
Congress is unlikely to cede that right to an inter- 
national body. Their demonstrated willingness to 
intercede in the standard-setting process is not 
likely to disappear. Lobbying by various groups 
will continue. International accounting standards 
have no government to enforce them. Second, the 
frauds likely to emerge from accounting standards 
that do not consider manager reactions, the impor- 
tance of verifiability and conservatism will cer- 
tainly reinforce Congress’s strong incentives to 
intervene. Third, having only one set of standards 
limits the evolution of accounting that works. 
When large numbers of companies can experiment 
and invent new methods of accounting, one of 
those experiments might actually improve finan- 
cial reporting and lead to other firms imitating the 
new accounting method. The number of such ex- 
periments has been reduced enormously by the ex- 
istence of national standard-setting bodies. 
Reduction of the number of standard-setting bod- 
ies that experiment similarly reduces the likeli- 
hood of efficient innovation. 
59 
Move to firm valuation. After centuries of trans- 
action-based financial statements and reporting, 
the FASB proposes financial reporting to move to 
a firm valuation approach. Inclusion of intangibles 
that are intended to capture rents, changes the bal- 
ance sheet from measurement of the opportunity 
cost of investment and the abandonment option to 
measurement of firm value. Schipper (2005) ar- 
gues that in estimating firm value the FASB imi- 
tates the market. The imitation comes from the use 
of discounted cash flows, earnings multiples, etc. 
However, the strength of market valuation is not 
the varying forms that market participants use to 
value firms, but the large numbers of participants 
with varying information that cause the market to 
incorporate a wide spectrum of information in the 
market price. The FASB mistakes the form of mar- 
ket valuation for its substance. In the past the 
FASB has acted as though an important function of 
accounting is to inform market participants, a 
function consistent with the evidence. This FASB 
is undertaking an experiment based on the form of 
the market process not its substance. Reliance on 
form means the experiment is likely to fail. Unless 
the SEC or other regulatory bodies intervene 
promptly, the experiment will generate significant 
numbers of market frauds. 
Correction seems unlikely to occur immediately. 
The FASB is still writing standards that are in- 
tended to include fair value (including valuation of 
the firm) into what is effectively its conceptual 
framework. On 21 October 2005 the FASB issued 
a working draft of SFAS 15X (fair value measure- 
ments, FASB 2005b) that the FASB intends to be 
effective for financial statements beginning after 
15 December 2006. On 25 January 2006, the 
FASB issued an exposure draft of a proposed state- 
ment of financial accounting standards (FASB 
2006) that suggests firms be given the option to 
value certain financial assets and liabilities at fair 
value, beyond the requirements of SFAS 1 15. That 
draft states that it is phase 1 of a fair value project. 
Phase 2 would extend the option to non-financial 
assets and liabilities and to some financial assets 
and liabilities excluded from phase 1 .  
5.3 Market use offinancial reporting 
Debt contracts have increasingly contracted out 
of a number of GAAP standards (see Watts, 1977; 
Leftwich, 1983; Beatty and Weber, 2005). If the 
FASB and IASB continue on their current course, 
debt contracts may cease to use GAAP-based ac- 
counting entirely. Similarly, compensation con- 
tracts currently use many performance measures 
other than earnings. I expect the relative use of 
modified GAAP earnings in top management com- 
pensation to decline if standard-setters continue on 
their current course. 
The declining use of accounting numbers from 
5.2. Future of the FASB 
The current FASB seems committed to a course 
that is likely to be disastrous for the institution. It 
will either be replaced by a governmental agency 
or significantly restructured. The reasons for this 
prediction are spread through my preceding dis- 
cussion. Two likely focal points are: 
Ability to audit standards. At the last American 
Accounting Association meeting a former board 
member (with no denial from the board members 
present) publicly declared that it was not the 
FASB’s responsibility to consider the ability to 
audit their standards when setting standards. The 
FASB’s sister institution, the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), that, like 
the FASB, is responsible to the SEC is concerned 
about the ability to audit recent standards such as 
SFAS 142. When the SEC has to examine specific 
examples of the problems that non-auditable stan- 
dards generate (frauds), it is highly likely to take 
the PCAOB’s side. Evidence of such a reaction is 
provided by the SEC’s relatively recent SAB 101 
that adopts a more conservative revenue recogni- 
tion standard than market forces generate (see 
Watts, 2003). Like all regulatory bodies, the SEC 
has strong incentives to be conservative. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 01
:04
 27
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
14
 
60 
the audited financial reports in their traditional 
contracting role is likely to affect the financial re- 
ports of private companies. It is entirely plausible 
that if GAAP-based reports do not meet the con- 
tracting market test, alternative accounting reports 
that are audited by non-CAs or CPAs could replace 
them. Recent CPA ethics cases suggest this is al- 
ready happening. 
If GAAP-based published audited financial 
statements also fail the market test in providing in- 
formation for share valuation (as seems likely if 
they are designed to value equity and produce un- 
verifiable numbers), individuals who currently use 
those statements will increasingly turn to other, 
more reliable, alternatives. 
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 
6. Conclusion 
The survival of GAAP-based financial reporting 
requires that reporting meet economic and politi- 
cal demands. Injudicious changes in reporting that 
do not consider economic and political forces will 
not survive or if they do, that reporting will be a 
mere formality and not be used for productive pur- 
poses. In this latter event, other mechanisms will 
arise to meet the demands ignored by formal re- 
porting. The result could well be that CPAs or CAs 
will find themselves replaced by competitive insti- 
tutions. 
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